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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ' 
JAMES P. SANDMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
\ 
) vs. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8202 
This appeal, taken by the State, is from the District 
Court's dismissal of a charge against defendant of the 
crime of resisting an officer attempting to discharge a duty 
of his office. The statute allegedly violated by defendant 
is Sec. 76-28-54, U. C. A. 1953, which reads: 
"Every person who wilfully resists, delays or 
obstructs any public officer in discharging, or at-
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2 
tempting to discharge, any duty of his office, when 
no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable 
:;: * * " 
After complaint was filed in the Heber City Justice 
Court (R. 7) the defendant by stipulation waived prelim-
inary hearing, reserving however his right to challenge the 
sufficiency of the pleadings and to move to dismiss in Dis-
trict Court (R. 13). The District Attorney then filed the 
information (R. 14) and the bill of particulars (R. 16-17). 
The relevant portion of the information charges: 
"* * * that on the 18th day of July, 1953, 
in Wasatch County, State of Utah, at Stinking 
Springs in said Wasatch County, the said defendant 
wilfully resisted Leo A. Cox, a public officer and 
Game Warden of the State of Utah, in attempting 
to discharge a duty of his office, contrary to the 
provisions of and in violation of the provisions of 
Section 76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953." 
The allegations of the bill of particulars are: 
"1. That on or about the 18th day of July, 
1953, at a place commonly known as Stinking 
Springs, in Wasatch County, Utah a game warden, 
one Leo A. Cox, while on duty in the performance 
of his duties as a game warden of the State of Utah, 
in the daytime, observed the defendant, James P. 
Sandman, while said Sandman was fishing at Stink-
ing Springs, and was using. what appeared to be 
hamburger or ground meat for bait. That upon ob-
serving the use of the type of bait above described 
by the defendant, said Leo A. Cox identified himself 
to the said defendant as a game warden of the State 
of Utah and asked to see the defendant's bait; and 
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at such time the said defendant, while the hook and 
bait with which he was fishing was in the water, 
moved the hook and bait back and forth in an ap-
parent effort to dislodge such bait and thereupon, 
the said Leo A. Cox told him not to do that and 
grabbed hold of the fishing pole held by the defen-
dant in an effort to prevent the dislodging of the 
bait, and in a scuffle which ensued both Leo A. Cox 
and the defendant fell into the water and while said 
Leo A. Cox was attempting to regain his feet while 
holding on to the pole he was violently struck in the 
face and about the head by the defendant. 
"2. That defendant violated the provisions of 
76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in resisting an 
officer in the discharge of his duties, the penalty 
being set forth in such statutory provision. 
"3. That the said Leo A. Cox was acting with-
in the authority of the law and the scope of his 
duties, pursuant to the provisions of the statutes of 
the State of Utah and particularly the provisions of 
Section 23-3-11, U. C. A., 1953; Section 23-3-7, U. 
C. A., 1953, as amended by the Session Laws of 
1953; Section 23-3-21, U. C. A., 1953 and Section 
76-28-39, U. C. A., 1953." 
At the trial, and after the prosecutor had made his 
opening statement, defendant renewed his motion to dis-
miss, which was read into the record (R. 24-25). The mo-
tion was granted, defendant was released, and his bail 
exonerated (R. 28). The apparent reason for the court's 
ruling appears at R. 27. The court's language is: 
"THE COURT: The Court has come to the 
conclusion that the motion should be granted unless 
the State of Utah is prepared to prove that an ar-
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rest was made before any altercation occurred be-
tween the parties." 
The prosecutor then made an offer of what the State in-
tended to prove (R. 28-29), which offer included no claim 
of arrest or attempted arrest. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The issue presented by this appeal is one of substantive 
law: whether the allegations of the bill, and the offer of 
proof, would if established beyond a reasonable doubt 
amount to a violation of Sec. 76-28-54, U. C. A. 1953. The 
information, from the pleading standpoint, validly charges 
the crime. Many earlier rules of criminal pleading were 
changed in 1935 by legislation. By the Act of 1935 (Sec. 
1, Ch. 118, Laws '35), which is now Sec. 77-21-8, U. C. A. 
1953, the tests for the validity of a criminal pleading were 
set down by the Legislature. Sec. 77-21-8 reads: 
" ( 1) The inforn1ation or indictment may 
charge, and is valid and sufficient if it charges the 
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offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted 
in one or more of the following ways : 
"(a) By using the name given to the offense 
by the common law or by a statute. 
"(b) By stating so much of the definition of 
the offense, either in terms of the common law or of 
the statute defining the offense or in terms of sub-
stantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give 
the court and the defendant notice of what offense 
is intended to be charged. 
"(2) The information or indictment may re-
fer to a section or subsection of any statute creating 
the offense charged therein, and in determining the 
validity or sufficiency of such information or in-
dictment reg:lrd shall be had to such reference." 
This information sufficiently charges the offense. The 
tests of Subsection ( 1) (b) and Subsection ( 2) are both 
met. Plainly, defendant was sufficiently put upon notice 
of the statute which he has been charged with having vio-
lated. An examination of the bill of particulars indicates 
with clarity and in detail the acts which defendant allegedly 
committed that allegedly amount to the crime charged. De-
fendant's right to know what he must defend against is 
fully satisfied by the pleadings. 
The question here then is whether the facts alleged 
amount to the crime charged. The only decision of our 
Supreme Court construing Sec. 76-28-54 is State v. Becken-
dorf, (1932) 79 Utah 360, 10 P. 2d 1073. That case re-
versed the conviction of a woman charged with wilful ob-
struction of officers "* * * being then and there en-
gaged in the lawful arrest of the said Martha Beckendorf." 
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The proof offered was that the officers, with a search and 
seizure warrant for liquor, entered defendant's house and 
found her destroying liquor. Defendant kicked an officer 
in the groin, threw a jug which cut him, threatened with a 
knife and escaped through a window. The court held that 
the evidence failed to support the information, there being 
no proof of an arrest or an attempt to make an arrest, as 
the inforn1ation had alleged. The defendant was not told 
that she was to be arrested, although there had been ample 
opportunity for the officers to have done so. The court, in 
the Beckendorf case, carefully set down the scope of its 
decision, and in so doing notes a distinction which is im-
portant for the instant case. The court stated ( 10 P. 2d, 
at 1075) : 
"The information charges defendant with de-
laying and obstructing officers then and there en-
gaged in her lawful arrest. The defendant was not 
charged with· obstructing and delaying officers en-
gaged in searching for intoxicating liquor." (Italics 
added.) 
The implication to be drawn from the italicized language 
is that the result would have been different had the plead-
ings alleged a lawful search. 
The Beckendorf case is not apposite. The case is an 
application of the settled rule that the proof must support 
the pleadings. This defendant can take no comfort from 
the case and in fact it if anything rather supports the 
theory of the prosecution. 
The court below apparently made this basic assump-
tion: a prosecution for resisting an officer in the perform-
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ance of official duties does not lie unless the prosecutor 
pleads and proves an arrest or an attempted arrest. Appel-
lant contends that this is not the true rule. Were that the 
rule, the difficulty imposed upon officers who enforce our 
game laws is manifest. Unpleasantness, and worse, would 
be inevitable. Game laws would be less efficiently enforced, 
or many civil suits for false arrest would result. It simply 
would not comport with common sense for the law to re-
quire that a warden formally place a fisherman under 
arrest before asking to inspect a bait which the officer has 
reason to believe is unlawful. If, in fact, the bait is unlaw-
ful, then is the time when an arrest makes sense. 
The general purpose of this statute is to prevent ob-
struction of or resistance to the efforts of a law enforce-
ment officer to perform any duty enjoined upon him by 
la~~. The cases are not limited to resisting arrest. A wide 
variety of official duties, if resisted or obstructed, form a 
basis for prosecution for this offense. As is said in 67 C. 
J. S., Obstructing Justice, p. 51-2 (with supporting foot-
notes set out below) : 
"Various acts have been held to constitute the 
offense, 6 such as blocking by defendant, with his 
body, the entrance of policemen, to a place which 
he admitted to the policemel?- he was using for pool 
6Qbstructing citrus fruit inspector-Unauthorized placing of com-
pound in citrus fruit juice which citrus fruit inspector is preparing 
to analyze, thereby producing chemical or physical change, is an 
offense within a statute providing that it shall be unlawful for any 
person to obstruct or resist any authorized inspector in the perform-
ance or discharge of any duty imposed on or required of him by law. 
-Johnson v. State, 128 So. 853, 99 Fla. 1311. Refusal to leave prem-
ises or surrender keys-Refusal of employee of state school for deaf 
to leave premises after notified of his. discharge and. refusal. to ~e­
liver keys and school property_ to superu;tend~nt constituted vwlatwn 
of statute relating to obstructing a pubhc off1cer.-Bathke v. Mykle-
bust, 12 N. W. 2d 550, 69 S. D. 534. 
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selling ;7 destruction of milk by a dealer to prevent 
inspection as to purity by an officer ;8 exhorting fol-
lowers to resist officers in execution of an ordin-
ance ;9 refusal of person when arrested for speeding 
to give his name and attempting to push from his 
automobile the arresting officer ;10 refusing to obey 
and surrender when arrested ;11 and use of forcible 
means in the presence of the officer to interfere 
with his custody of property."12 
In State v. Pope, 4 Wash. 2d 421, 103 P. 2d 1089, an 
officer executing a writ of replevin by entering a house and 
removing a refrigerator was forcibly abused by the de-
fendant. The case holds the defendant guilty of "resisting 
a public officer engaged in the performance of a legal duty." 
In Palmquist v. United States, 149 F. 2d 352, cert. den, 
326 U. S. 727, 90 L. Ed 431, 66 S. Ct. 33, revenue agents 
on their way to an unlawful still and expecting the trans-
portation of moonshine away from the still, met a truck, 
which they crowded from the road. They announced they 
were federal officers. Defendant then drove the officers 
away with a shotgun. Defendant's conviction was affirmed, 
the court stating (149 F. 2d at 353) : 
''We do not deem it necessary to discuss the 
principles of lawful searches and seizures for the 
reason that there was no arrest and there was no 
7N. Y.-People v. Frank, 130 N. Y. S. 807, 73 Misc. 1, 26 N. Y. 
Cr. 308. 
spuerto Rico.-People v. Rivera, 25 Puerto Rico 700. 
9Mich.-People v. King, 210 N. W. 235, 236 Mich. 405, 48 A. L. 
R. 742. 
1oCal.-People v. Martensen, 245 P. 1101, 76 Cal. App. 763. 
11 Philippine.-U. S. v. Resaba, 1 Philippine 311. 
120hio.-Campf v. State, 88 N. E. 887, 80 Ohio St. 321. 
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search made of either the truck or the person of the 
defendant for violations of the liquor law. There 
was no information as to the illegal manufacture 
or transportation of liquor gained by the officers' 
contact with the defendant on the night in question, 
and he is not being tried for any offense that a 
search of the truck could have revealed. It is de-
batable, but unnecessary to decided, whether the 
officers in this case were without right, under the 
circumstances, to stop defendant's truck, in view of 
the information possessed by them, after they saw 
its blinking lights and that it was coming from the 
direction of a suspected still and on the road in 
which a liquor truck was expected, at or about the 
time expected. But we do not see how the constitu-
tional rights of a defendant against unreasonable 
search can be said to have been violated when there 
was no search. None of the evidence necessary for a 
conviction in this case was obtained by virtue of a 
search, lawful or otherwise, and the motion to sup-
press the evidence and other kindred defenses were 
without merit. The issue in the case is whether or 
not the defendant knowingly resisted Federal offi-
cers in the attempted performance of their duty. 
This was an issue of fact which the jury resolved 
against the defendant, with substantial evidence to 
support its verdict. Two officers and the truck 
driver testified that when the officers first arrived 
at the scene Officer Carter announced that they were 
Federal officers. If the defendant knew they were 
Federal officers, even though he also knew they were 
planning to search his truck without a warrant, he, 
nevertheless, had no right to assault them with a 
shotgun. See Cook v. United States, 5 Cir., 117 F. 
2d 37 4. If the jury had believed that the defendant 
truly thought himself to be resisting a hold-up, there 
would have been an acquittal, but it found on ample 
evidence that defendant knew he was resisting Fed-
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eral officers in the atten1pted performance of offi-
cial duty." 
In State v. Po1vell, 99 Cal. App. 2d 178, 221 P. 2d 117, 
defendant vvas convicted of this crime because he struck 
a policeman engaged in suppressing a public brawl bet\veen 
t\vo women in a cafe. Apparently no warrants were in-
volved in that case, but the offense which the officers were 
seeking to suppress took place in the officer's presence. 
The reasonableness of Warden Cox's behaviour is ob-
vious. There was no oppression, no justification for de-
fendant's attack. Cox approached, and identified himself 
to, a man who was apparently then committing an offense. 
The man's immediate response was to attempt to rid him-
self of and destroy the instrumentality of the crime. War-
den Cox merely did the obvious and absolutely necessary 
thing. Cox was in this case simply performing a duty en-
joined upon hin1 by the Fish and Game Code, i. e., attempt-
ing to enforce the prohibition against fishing with unlawful 
bait. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully urges that the pleadings give 
defendant full notice of the acts which he allegedly com-
mitted, and full notice of what criminal offense those acts 
allegedly amounted to. If the state can prove the alleged 
acts beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has com-
mitted a crime. The state should be permitted to present 
its case to a jury. The ruling should be reversed and the 
case remanded to the District Court with the instructions 
to try the case on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON, 
Distric·t Attorney, 
~JOHN W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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